Cultural diplomacy and Cultural imperialism: A Framework for the analysis

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The intention of this interdisciplinary volume is to contribute to the ongoing debate on cultural diplomacy in Europe and to discuss it also inside a framework of cultural imperialism since cultural imperialism often comes together with cultural diplomacy. We are looking into art, externally oriented cultural diplomacy, stereotyping and into so-called, Inside-Outside oriented, cultural diplomacy. The discussion is centred on the issue of how cultural diplomacy manifests itself in a variety of practices and policies.

It is apparent that cultural diplomacy manifests in many fields and that, sometimes, it becomes exceptionally difficult to distinguish where cultural diplomacy ends and public diplomacy begins. Sometimes it is difficult even to distinguish among policies of cultural diplomacy itself where placing these policies in one place becomes a rather difficult task because each aspect has various connotations. This is why there is no agreement on what cultural and public diplomacy are, how they are being enforced, how they manifest in practice, what effect do they have or even how to define them.

Problems of Definition

Both the terms public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy are new and sometimes used interchangeably. However, current scholarship generally views cultural diplomacy as conceptually and practically a subset of public diplomacy (Mark 2009; Signitzer 2008; Higham 2001; Marsden 2003; Leonard et al 2002; Schneider 2005).

The placement of cultural diplomacy within the realm of public diplomacy reflects a massive change in the way cultural diplomacy is currently viewed and applied. As Mark (2009) has stressed, historically cultural diplomacy was associated with implementing cultural agreements, rather than with the practice of public diplomacy. Despite its position within the domain of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is not synonymous with it. Recognizing this vital difference has been complicated by the lack of clarity of what exactly the practice of cultural diplomacy entails and by what Fox (1999) calls the “semantic baggage” of the terms...
“Diplomacy” and “Culture.” Lending (2000) has pointed to the “major semantic differences” in connotations of the term that vary from country to country. For instance, as Wyszomirski (2003) notes, the French term ‘diplomatie culturelle’ designates international cultural policy in Austria, the Netherlands, and Sweden; while it refers to cultural relations in Australia, Canada, Singapore, and the UK.

This analysis does not intend to propose a fixed definition of the term. It considers some of the problems of definition, some of the ways it is used, and scholarly work to differentiate between public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and cultural relations.

While the constituents of public diplomacy are as old as statecraft, it was first used in 1965 to mean efforts of international actors to achieve foreign policy objectives by interacting with foreign publics since the close of the Cold War (Cull, 2008). Diplomacy is conventionally understood to mean government-to-government (and diplomat-to-diplomat) exchange. The term public diplomacy draws itself to the level of the people – to indicate government to people (of another country) and further to the level of people more generally (of one country) to people (of another country) (Manhein 1990; Henrikson 2006). It encompasses a wide and shifting terrain of processes and activities which can range from government actors speaking by way of the media to the people, or in people-to-people exchanges, such as an academic exchange between professors from different countries articulated in a Cultural Agreement ratified by the Ministry of Education of both countries. These two approaches may be loosely divided into two functions, which (Signitzer, 2008) quotes:

1. “Public diplomacy is a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and cultures, as well as its national goals and current policies” (Tuch, 1990)

2. “(The goal of public diplomacy is) … to influence the behavior of a foreign government by influencing the attitudes of its citizens” (Malone, 1988)

Following Signitzer (2008) and Deibel and Roberts (1976), these two approaches constitute the two fundamental elements of public diplomacy: persuasion by way of political information; and cultural communication that aims at cultivating mutual understanding. Political information operates within a short-term time frame from mediated dissemination to crises management of government policies or actions. The mutual understanding sought through cultural communication is long-term in scope, aiming at the presentation of one’s own society (Signitzer 2008; Deibel and Roberts 1976; James 1955). Political information is disseminated with fast media—mainstream news media (newspapers, radio, television, internet, etc.)—in what James (1955) calls a “tough minded” school. Cultural communication he frames as “tender minded” slow media—academic and artistic exchange, exhibitions, films, language instruction, etc.) (Frankel, 1965).

For Leonard (1997) and Sablosky (2003) it is the long-term relationship building that distinguishes cultural diplomacy from public diplomacy. Leonard (1997) articulated an influential three-tiered conceptualization of public diplomacy with time as its metric. The first tier is short-term and may take hours or days. The next tier is medium-term strategic communication that is executed within months. The last tier, which is the province of cultural diplomacy, is tied to the long-term relationship building and may take years (Leonard, 1997).

Signitzer (2008) is sensitive to the slippage between dissemination of political information and cultural communication. He sees them operating on a continuum with parameters that are unclear and unstable and proposes to “accentuate them by radicalizing them”. Along with Malone (1988), Signitzer positions political information in terms of political advocacy; while cultural communication is conceived as moving beyond the cultivation of mutual understanding, “to include sensitisation of one’s own society as to how it is seen by the other society” (Signitzer, 2008). This concept of co-orientation is well established in the communication sciences (McLeod and Chaffee, 1973). The concept of co-orientation or “sensitisation” may be implicit in the goal of cultivating mutual understanding, but it is an objective that is little highlighted in standard definitions of cultural diplomacy, even in the recent revisionary work of Donfried and Hecht (2010).

Following Signitzer (2008), public diplomacy is found in the political arena of the foreign ministry that is at the higher echelons or top of policy making. Cultural communication, on the other hand, may be free to operate apart from the daily pressures of foreign policy. It extends into institutions entrusted with the international section of education or culture ministry or partially autonomous institutes abroad (Signitzer, 2008), such as the British Council, Alliance française, the Societá Dante Alighieri, the Cervantes Institute, the German Goethe Institute, or the Adam Mickiewicz Institute.

Mitchell (1986) divides cultural communication into two categories: cultural diplomacy and cultural relations (see also Signitzer and Coombs, 1992). According to Mitchell (1986), cultural diplomacy has two levels of meaning: “One refers to the negotiation of formal cultural agreements, the other applies to the execution of these agreements and the conduct of cultural relations flowing from them.”

Both may be directly underwritten by political entities or delegated by governments to external cultural institutions and agencies. According to Signitzer (2008), who follows Mitchell (1986), “the goal of cultural diplomacy is to promote positive attitudes towards one’s own country with the hope that this may be beneficial to overall diplomatic goal achievement. Scholars such as Fox, Lendrum, Cummings and Mitchell define a range of structural mechanisms through
which cultural diplomacy is administered—for example government ministries and departments, independent agencies, and private, not-for-profit foundations.

**Cultural Relations** develops mutual understanding between countries or states for mutual benefit and is marked by various forms of exchange rather than selective projections of national identity or character. Higham (2001) makes a strong distinction between cultural relations and cultural diplomacy:

International Cultural Relations, as funded and encouraged by national governments at least, generally have a different objective, cultural development...that of building a country’s competence and capacity for its own artistic expression through international exposure and collaborations abroad with other artistic or cultural professionals. The Alliance Francaise, the Goethe Institute, the British Council, the Japan Foundation and even Canada Council were founded in varying degrees on the cultural development/international cultural relations rationale and less as tools designed exclusively for cultural diplomacy.

L’Etang (2006) is sceptical of the possibility of symmetrical relations between states in public relations, even in the more limited category of cultural relations. Drawing a distinction between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, within the broader category of public diplomacy, represents one school of thought. One implication of this separation is that cultural diplomacy supposes tighter control, since the actors are narrowed to instrument of the state to produce specific “positive attitudes” toward a nation and so are fundamentally propaganda.

Mitchell (1986) states that cultural diplomacy “is essentially the business of governments.” Contrary to this position are approaches that see cultural diplomacy as a means to act apart from politics; in this sense, collapsing into Mitchell’s category of cultural relations (Feigenbaum, 2008) and separated from governmental exigencies and administration. Finally, a third group of scholars, such as Donfried and Hechti (2010) have sought to liberate the term “cultural diplomacy” from a one dimensional assignment as an instrument of the state, an association which tends to tie it to state manipulation, and consequent marginalization within diplomatic activities. Donfried and Hechti explore the fine, porous, and fluid line between propaganda and information, between institutions operated by the state and those independent, nongovernmental organizations. They have complicated assumptions about cultural diplomacy instituted by political agents by pointing to the dependency of government organizations on non-governmental actors. Artists, teachers, curators, students etc. who have agendas and interests of their own may take state drawn policy lines, regardless of the governmental program under whose jurisdiction they may operate.

Donfried and Hechti underline the problem with Mitchell’s (1986) implication that cultural diplomacy is more subject to state control and manipulation, while international cultural relations is freer to operate in substantially more idealistic terms. It is polarisation of terms that has flaws on both sides. This is a point that Mark (2009) also underlines. He points out that to suppose that cultural diplomacy uses flattering, “selective self-projection” would undermine the credibility of cultural diplomacy, a key property of effective soft power (Nye, 2008). There are numerous examples of this in films, where a film presents its country of origin in an unflinchingly honest light. Mark points to the New Zealand film, Once there Were Warriors (1994), but many other examples may be found, such as Waltz with Bashir (2008), an animated Israeli documentary film about the 1982 Lebanon War. Credibility, in an era marked by a dramatic increase in access to alternative sources of information, has become increasingly relevant to cultural diplomacy. Perceptions of credibility are a critical check in the flattering self-projection strategies of nations’ employment of cultural diplomacy.

The question of state control and image projection raises the issue that has significantly contributed to cultural diplomacy’s historical marginalization: that it is, as Higham (2001) suggests, at the most basic level “self interested propaganda”. The contention is obviously based on how propaganda is defined. If the definition is “information, ideas, opinions or images, often only giving one part of an argument, which are broadcast, published or in some way spread with the intention of influencing people’s opinions” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2009) then clearly cultural diplomacy and propaganda may be linked. But as Mark (2009), drawing on the work of Melissen (2005; 2006), has argued it is an error to see cultural diplomacy as synonymous with propaganda. The analysis of Melissen (2006) provides a useful framework for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the terms.

Melissen places public diplomacy and propaganda on a “continuum ranging from the crude and manipulative propaganda aiming at short-term political effects to two-way public diplomacy for the ‘long haul’ based on dialogue with foreign audiences.” Instead of seeking to prove differences between the two terms in relation to objectives, he looks at the form their communication takes. Propaganda and crude forms of public diplomacy engage in the “rather primitive business of peddling one’s own views and narrowing other people’s minds. If experiences with propaganda is any guide – it may work, but its effect will not be lasting… It does not make friends… [and] has no listening capacity and is not dialogical… not being ‘interactive’ is the kiss of death in the age of ICT [Information Communications Technology].” In contrast, he states “the new public diplomacy is marked by distinct traits: first, it is two-way communication. Its keywords are ‘engagement’, ‘dialogue’, and ‘mutuality’” (Melissen, 2006). This framing of public and cultural diplomacy in terms of interactivity is extremely important in light of the radical changes in technology and the traffic of information and images through a far wider range of conduits than in the past. Apart from political component of the public diplomacy (Signitzer, 2008) already
discussed earlier—where speed is the metric—news and crises management may still operate in classically one sided terms. But beyond this kind of immediacy of information dissemination, Melissa sees public diplomacy, which can be related here to cultural diplomacy, as containing many similarities to the relationship-building characteristic of foreign cultural relations. At the same time, Lending’s (2000) proposal that propaganda is fundamentally “the dissemination of more or less doubtful truths for the purpose of influence and manipulation” does underline the challenge of untangling the practices of cultural diplomacy from propaganda. As Mark (2009) has stated, “one government’s cultural diplomacy ‘truth’ undertaken to influence could conceivably be another government’s ‘lies’ for the purposes of manipulation.” However, it should be clear enough that the terms of cultural diplomacy and propaganda are not synonymous.

Melissa’s stress on the new age of Information Communication Technology and the new kinds of demands it is making on the practices of cultural diplomacy raises the important issue of how the practice of cultural diplomacy changes in relation to information technology and the way it engages new media, new audiences, and new kinds of disseminators of information.

P. van Ham in his analysis of the rise of the “Brand State” and the nature of post-modern politics has argued that the terrain of geopolitics and power is shifting to a post-modernist one defined by images and influence. Ryniejska (2009) provides a clear analysis of these issues and draws on the work of E. Gibbon who perceived public diplomacy in relation to the media and frames it as a channel for a wide range of state and non-state actors who utilize it to influence external public opinion abroad. Ryniejska (2009) believes that media, even the short-term variety, representing one country to another, via state or non-state actors, should not be excluded from the realm of diplomacy, if it is engaged in creating an image of a state in an international context.

This is contrast to Sznider (2008) and Szondi who place public diplomacy under the purview of foreign policy, while the vast range of other mechanisms conveying the image of a country—nation branding, tourism promotion, image production and management etc.—fall into the category of international relations. The of Brand’s apparent objectives is to establish nation branding in a field where it has received little attention, compared to public diplomacy. To establish a stronger force, the concept of nation branding, specifically, he tends to want to sever it from a diplomatic context to avoid conflation with it. Ryniejska (2009) aptly notes that this overlooks numerous points of convergence between public and cultural diplomacy and international relations and contests the practical implications of Brand’s stress on separation in the interest of encouraging cooperation and mutual implementation between the two fields. Such mutual collaboration is especially relevant to the EU’s cultural diplomacy where the interest is constructing a European identity in terms of a state or nation’s diversity. Creating a division between branding and diplomacy, as Szondi does, may have policy implications that limit the efficacy of actors and activities in the realm of international relations to strengthen the policy driven goals of public diplomacy.

In addition to recognizing points of convergence and collaboration between international relations and public and/or cultural diplomacy, recent scholarship has pointed to the new power of the individual in the age of the Internet. In the digital age, it is crucial to recognize how cultural diplomacy can operate beyond not only the top-level arena of policy making by government actors, but also that initiated by powerful disseminators of information who may operate from below. Historically, established national media conduits of the economically most powerful countries have the most powerful and the highest number of technological vehicles to generate and disseminate information on the international stage so easily becoming agents of cultural imperialism.

But new technology and networked communities, not only across national borders but also in opposition to dominant ideologies, open a window for a powerful, bottom-up manifestation of cultural diplomacy. Cull (2008) points to the power of new small technologies to derail the power of established media networks, and carefully orchestrated publicity events aligned to foreign policy objectives. He writes:

Examples of the power of this new technology to wrong-foot the powers that-be abound, from the ability of a photograph from a cell phone to circulate the globe and derail a carefully planned media event to speed with which an SMS text message can be passed from person to person, and rally citizens to a protest. Besides new technology, it is equally important to also consider the new demography and political economy that underpin contemporary international relations. International communication is not necessarily about CNN or multi-million-dollar cultural centres overseas. Any message that crosses a frontier is an international communication.

Cull states that while the mobilization of digital technologies in the interest of cultural diplomacy may be daunting it could have major results. Among its potentialities is to act as a balancing mechanism to work against the top-down approach of conventional cultural diplomacy and cultural imperialist effects. Cull goes on to position Listening as a critical part of cultural diplomacy; in other words hearing what kinds of ideas are emerging from a target audience and facilitating the kind of orientation, mentioned previously. Developing awareness of foreign public opinion into the practice of public diplomacy is a neglected and critically important issue in the digital age. Cull (2008) points to the way in which advances in software and the proliferation of online source material have made it possible to monitor online media in English in real time, and other sources in near real time.” He does mention the advances being made in translation software that would broaden
the scope of this project of cross-cultural empathy to an even greater degree. For Cull, communication relations begin to operate in the realm of public and cultural diplomacy as soon they are recognized as tools to facilitate the fundamental goals of mutual understanding. He does not separate public diplomacy from public relations.

This kind of qualitative research on public opinion in the past may have been assigned to a press attaché or a diplomat in the field but now is accessible through new digital modes of communication. Precisely because the digital age produces vast amounts of data communication that is no longer a formal arm of the media or foreign policy, it has the power to be mobilized in ways that facilitate mutual understanding to a significant, and probably unprecedented, degree. Cull states that current public diplomacy needs to create a way of conceiving of the public diplomat, “as that of the creator and disseminator of “memes” (ideas capable of being spread from one person to another across a social network) and as a creator and facilitator of networks and relationships.”

Both cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy are examples of soft power. According to Nye (2008) soft power is not simply influence, though it is one kind of influence. Influence that is coercive can also rest on hard power—military or economic threats for example. Soft power is also more than a matter of persuasion or the ability to convince through argument, though this too is an important element of it. Soft power is fundamentally the ability to entice and attract; it is in behavioural language—the power of attraction.

For Verčič (2008) the mechanics of soft power are indistinguishable from those of public relations so calling attention to the semantic divisions in the academic field and the value of transcending them. In the political arena, soft power is mobilized as an instrument by governments to communicate and attract the publics of other countries, rather than at the high-level echelons of government. A range of strategies may be used to mobilize the power of attraction—broadcasting, cultural exports, exchanges and so on—but if they are not attractive they cannot generate soft power. While the soft power of the United States is well known, it may be undercut by policies that discredit values associated with it—most recently the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Nye isolates three resources enabling soft power: its culture (in so far as it is attractive); political values (when they are integrated and when they are reflected in actions at home and abroad); and foreign policy (when they are seen as legitimate and with an ethical foundation).

It should be borne in mind that soft power may resonate and be effective in one country and have the opposite effect in another—for instance some American values may resonate in Australia, Europe, or South Korea in varying degrees, but be rejected in Iran or Saudi Arabia. Soft power has the power to repel as much as it attracts. This is especially evident if one looks closely at the assumptions of negativity of certain European or American values and how they can uncritically inhabit structures of “artistic hegemony” or “cultural imperialism.” For example Fundamentalist Christian values in the United States may resonate in Muslim countries but these are not internationally mobilized with moral authority as an attractive form of power, where other more comfortably “Western” values are.

Credibility is also a critical element in the agency of soft power. In the age of information vast parts of the world have much greater access to information through a much wider range of news media, as well as information disseminated by critical non-government organizations, and networks of scientific communities (Nye, 2008). At the same time Simon (1998) and Nye (2008) have pointed to the “paradox of plenty” with regard to the quantity of information now accessible and suggest that capturing attention has become a critical factor in generating soft power. Consequently, garnering attention while carefully navigating political struggles over the creation of credibility are key components of soft power. Politics, as Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999) have stated may be less about a traditional military victory, but in an information age, “may ultimately be about whose story wins.”

Ryniewska (2009) makes an important point about the implications of the EU deployment of soft power. The United States’ use of soft power, say, in Afghanistan, may possibly wane in relation to its involvement there. When a potential EU country falls under the sway of soft power, its strength “is broad and deep: once sunk into its sphere of influence, countries are changed forever” (Leonard, 2005). She points to the impact of the EU on Polish society—“from its economic policy, through property rights and treatment of minorities to what is served on tables.” This example throws into high relief the issue of cultural imperialism and its inevitable tie to economic development. Tomlinson (2002) defines the term as the use of political and economic power to exalt and spread the values and habits of a foreign culture at the expense of a native culture.” Herbert Schiller (1976), the widely known writer on media imperialism, defined cultural imperialism as the sum of the process by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating center of the system.

The EU’s well-known effort to counter this is evident in its search for a unifying European identity by pursuing “unity in diversity”. Searching for intercultural dialogue is purportedly one of the primary objectives of EU cultural policy, and is behind numerous projects ranging from language initiatives to facilitating transnational audiences and mobility of people across borders.

A word should be said about the supposed dangers arising from “cultural assimilation” or “Coca-colonization or McDonaldization,” debates which have run as Harris and Inglehart (2009) have observed, for half a century. This is
taken shape in recent years—among these the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the European Union (Norris and Inglehart, 2009). In their new study, Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World (2009) they propose that the expansion of information from the so-called “global North to South” will have the highest degree of impact on converging values in the areas of integration into world markets, freedom of the press, and widespread access to the media. The authors drew from empirical evidence at both the societal and individual level, and drew evidence also from the World Values Survey, which encompasses 90 societies in all of the major regions of the world from 1981 to 2007.

Europe and Culture

When it comes to cultural imperialism that we just mentioned, it is notable that Europe is not immune to these practices either or, at least it is reasonable to state that Europe has a history of certain practices that could be considered as hegemonic and imperial due to its colonial past. This colonial past relates to individual European states and not the EU or Europe that, as some scholars observe, does not exist and particularly not as a sovereign power (Delany, 2005).

A whole other question emerges when one asks what it means to be European and if it is possible to be one. For example, Delany (2005, p. 11) argues that being European is “in a certain sense, optional or vague, lacking a clearly defined set of markers”. Paul Valéry (1962), on the other hand, described Europe as a sort of a supra state that created citizens that belong to it while others claim that being European means having a lifestyle that is related to the behaviour of the so-called West (e.g. Borneman and Fowler, 1997).

But, some sort of Europe and the notion of being European exists at least on the upper level within the European elite presented in the EU’s governing bodies, while the feelings of European citizens toward being European remain rather unclear and problematic, as numerous research studies have demonstrated.

When it comes to culture and cultural diplomacy, Europe currently presents a case of an ongoing struggle with one joint cultural policy coming from the fact that cultural policies of different European countries still differ, while, at the same time, these policies always take the national as its foci.

It is beyond the possibility of one introduction study to address all relevant issues in an in-depth analysis of the EU’s cultural policy let alone to discuss all distinctive policies that exist in the EU Member States and non-EU European countries. However, we will try to address certain turning points that might give a picture of the complexity of the issue when it comes to notions of Europe and its culture, heritage and civilisation that affect present dual and somewhat distorted cultural policy and cultural diplomacy of the EU.

When it comes to the notion of Europe, it is difficult to determine where to begin due to the complexity of the issue. However, Europe most certainly always had a hegemonic aspect, constructed in opposition to a certain ‘other’. Calhoun (2003, p. 4) argues that the idea of Europe derives from “a claim to collective identity, ‘we’ in relation to ‘the others’” and that “the idea of Europe continued to be invented in contrast to non-Europeans, especially in colonies”. In this vision, as Calhoun observes, Europe was understood as a civilisation that has the right to dominate and this civilisational claim then developed into the project that eventually constructed “Europeanness.” This challenge existed since the advent of colonialism, since colonies were taught European civilisation but this civilisation teaching was conveyed to those who were colonised and therefore “Europeans needed to learn how to understand and reproduce civilizational identities that were less problematic at home” (Calhoun, 2003, p. 6). To this, we may add that much of the European colonization was concerned with asserting its civilizational superiority (see e.g. Fisher–Tiné, 2005).

Other scholars have also argued that the idea of Europe existed in a much older form (Hay 1957; Delany 1995; Pageden 2002; Perkins 2004) and at its beginning it was conceived as Latin Christendom as opposed to Islam and Orthodox Christianity. The notion of Latin Christendom is still found in the essence of Europe, although European integration remains secularly oriented due to the criticism of religious aspects (Calhoun 2003; Boldt et al 2009).\footnote{This “Europeanness” has always been particularly present among elites and, in this sense the notion of Europe and the European identity existed before European nation states were founded as an ideal political and cultural organization of the state (Calhoun 2003; Anderson 1991). Consequently, the notion of creating European identity certainly existed before the desire to create one common cultural identity (Calhoun 2003; Boldt et al 2009; Vidmar Horvat 2012). Competition in colonies brought wars and after two World Wars in Europe, European countries started to unite again in, what is today, the European Union. However, European heritage still remains founded on European values, traditions and practices but also on those practices that Europeans brought from its colonies that enriched Europe.}

The same applies to the reference list we are using here and that we do not consider as complete nor do we imply that authors we cited here are the only authors in the field who should be considered as the only authorities on this complex matter.
Many authors compared building of the EU with nation building because nation states built a sense of belonging and a common identity via the creation of national culture (Nederveen Pieterse 1991; Outhwaite 2008; Shore 2000; 2006; Mokre 2006). This is something the EU is also trying to accomplish by creating the common culture and a sense of belonging to it (Shore 2006 in Vidmar Horvat 2012). Because collective identities were often understood through their cultural identities this was not, for a long time, on the European agenda (Mokre, 2006). The EU has, since its beginning, been more preoccupied in producing common foreign and security policy than common European culture that came on the policy agenda rather late (Calhoun 2003; Shore 2006; Mokre 2006; Kraus 2011; Vidmar Horvat 2012).

European identity, on the other hand, came to the public agenda as early as 1973 when the Declaration on European Identity was introduced after the Copenhagen meeting. The Declaration outlined the need for European unification that was seen as having a dynamic nature and as open to every country that shares the same ideals and objectives. However, the Declaration specifically outlined that unification achieved until 1973 serves as a basis for further unification, creation of the EU and creation of the European identity. The common European identity was to be based on diversity of cultures inside common European civilisation with which the notion of European civilisation is being re-introduced. However, the European identity also entailed a reference to culture but a diverse culture and not one common European culture:

"The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilisation, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism" (Declaration on European Identity, 1973, 1/3).

It appears that civilisation is to be kept in common to European citizens while the culture is designated to remain within national borders as has been the case since the beginning, and as expressed in the Treaty of Rome that formed European Economic Community that had no reference to culture.

The Declaration on European Identity appeared to consolidate Europe as a player on the international world map and to construct the European identity and Europe's place in the world after two large financial crises (Strath 2002; Boldt et al 2009). This declaration also served as a legitimising aspect for the European unification (Shore 1993; Boldt et al 2009).

Numerous academic studies appeared and the majority of them concluded that the European identity is weak and presents a complex issue (see e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2004; Bruter 2003, 2004, 2005; Hermann et al 2004; Gillespie and Laffan 2006; Risse 2004; Schild 2001; Strath 2002; Favell 2008, Fligstein 2008, Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Medrano 2003).

Many also concluded that national still bears more relevance than the European (Carey 2002; Smith 2003; McLaren 2006; Boldt et al 2009).

The others expressed views according to which national and European need not to be exclusive of each other and seen as conflictive types of identification (Herb and Kaplan 1999; Díez Medrano and Gutierrez 2001; Risse 2004; Ichijo and Spohn 2005).

Some other authors (Delanty, 2005) insist that in comparison to the American hyphenated identity of being, for example, Irish-American or Italian-American that makes the American identification possible, something like this does not exist in Europe where there is no, for example, German-European identity and particularly not, as in the US where African-American identification exists, African-European identity. On the contrary, what does exist, in this view, is the lifestyle that might be considered as European even if there is no personal identification. This means that being European can mean being cosmopolitan in orientation towards the world while remaining uninterested in culture and politics (Delanty, 2005). In this vision, a notion of cosmopolitanism is being introduced as a type of identification.

However, despite the ambitious plan to create a large and internationally important Europe, which some authors claim not to exist, particularly not when it comes to European culture (Delanty, 2005), culture remained in the shadow of this plan. This is particularly visible in Section I of the Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity that reads:

"Although in the past the European countries were individually able to play a major role on the international scene, present international problems are difficult for any of the Nine to solve alone. International developments and the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers mean that Europe must unite and speak with a single voice. European cosmopolitanism would mean: "Europeans are citizens with a world outlook. What does this consist of? In the most basic sense it means that the citizens of one country consider themselves to be citizens of another, the "one of us"... it means the recognition of living in a world of diversity and in the fundamental virtue of embracing positively the values of the other. While this entails an identity of the European elites, there is some evidence that it has become a more

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3 Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome formulated activities of the Community but there is no reference in creating a common European culture. Other articles also do not mention common culture. See Treaty of Rome, retrieved 8 July from European Commission's Website: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf
increasingly with one voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world” (Declaration on European Identity, 1973, II/6).

As well as in the Section III of the Declaration:

“The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy. They are convinced that building up this policy will help them to tackle with confidence and realism further stages in the construction of a United Europe thus making easier the proposed transformation of the whole complex of their relations into a European Union” (Declaration on European Identity, III/22).

Recently, Europe has been preoccupied with diversity that is related to cultural matters and that is particularly visible in the EU’s motto ‘United in diversity’. This has been a highly contested issue due to the traditional divisions inside Europe that have existed since the beginning of the unification process. This motto is also particularly visible in trans-European activities (Kraus, 2006), as well as in European activities against discrimination expressed in a motto ‘For Diversity. Against Discrimination’ (Kraus, 2011).

Kraus (2011, p. 8) states, “if cultural homogenization represented one of the dominant paradigms of European modernity and was an objective actively pursued by many state-makers and nation-builders, the embrace of diversity in a good part of contemporary political discourses must be considered a very significant change.” He understands the term diversity as a cultural diversity meaning that diversity presents the pattern of identification that affects social life and it expresses itself in ethnicity, language and religion. According to this view, collective identities in present European are those of the majority and ‘their’ state, indigenous minority population and that of immigration. Nonetheless, he correctly observes that identity of the majority can hardly be considered as compact and united to consider it as one unique major identity and culture (Kraus, 2011).

In an enlarged and culturally enriched Europe, what it means to be from a certain country changed as well as did the meaning of what it means to be European. This is also changing due to naturalized citizens with non-European origins, who have citizenship of EU member states but a diverse cultural background (see Kraus, 2011) as well as other variable aspects. One is that the EU, when cultural diversity is at stake, largely protects its own cultural diversity or the cultural diversity of its member states (Kraus, 2011) and not the European culture for which some authors claim not to exist because there is no essence for such a concept (Delanty, 2005).

Strath (2002) argues that the fall of Communism that started in 1989 brought more consideration to the European identity and its redefinition.

This particularly makes sense in light of what Kundera said to Western Europe in his writings or, in his quest addressed to Western Europe, asking Europe to save Central Europe from Soviet influence based on the premise of its common heritage and values, regardless of its historical division between east and west. Kundera thought that Central Europe is the cradle of European identity (Kundera, 1984) and this is often seen in the former Communist bloc, where countries claim to be cradles of Christianity and an ‘anteurale Christianitiatis’ to identify themselves as fully and unquestionably European (Topič et al, 2009). Nonetheless, Kundera thought that countries of the former eastern bloc belong to the West culturally and to the East politically because the identity of people and civilization, in his view, “is reflected and concentrated in what has been created by the mind – in what is known as ‘culture’” (Kundera, 1984, p. 2). Culture is in his view what unites Europe as one civilisation gathered around ancient Greek culture and Judeo-Christian thought.

However, Western Europe stood still and observed events surrounding the collapse of Communism without an appropriate reaction, even when the war in former Yugoslavia occurred (Vidmar Horvat and Delanty, 2008; Vidmar Horvat, 2012) and this has caused dual feelings in the former Communist bloc that today express a certain amount of reluctance to identify fully as European but for different reasons than those in the west where a similar situation also exists (e.g. in the UK citizens also feels a low degree of attachment to the notion of being European but for different reasons).

The changes that occurred after 1989, general divisions between east and west, and also the enlargement process of the EU into the former Communist bloc, have influenced the feelings toward the European identity (Vidmar Horvat, 2012). The processes of enlargement brought about a rise in considerations on what means to be European and to have a European identity, and a vast number of research studies have been conducted to explore this. The enlargement process caused a new division within Europe. Whereas before there was a division between eastern and western Europe, today we have a division to the so-called ‘Modest Europe’ or ‘New Europe’ and this is expressed even in some studies conducted by the
which includes cultural habits and feelings of belonging as well (Eurobarometer 2011; for the analysis of these practices see Vidmar Horvat, 2012). And, this then influences the cultural identities and poses a question whether there is a common European culture and identity and is it possible to have one.

As already noted, not much attention has been paid to drafting a joint cultural policy at the beginning of the European unification process. It took until the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 to list culture as the “European competence” (Culture Action Europe, 2012) and this was done in Article 151 that regulates

“the flowering of cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore” (Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, Article 151, Clause 1).

However, actions that Community planned to undertake were centred on culture and history of the European peoples and promotion of diversity as well as to encourage cooperation between Member States but also between Member States and the third countries:

“Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:
- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples;
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance; - non-commercial cultural exchanges; - artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.

The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of Europe.

The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.”
(Treaty of Maastricht 1992, Article 151, Clauses 2, 3, 4).

This document laid down the ground for the motto ‘United in diversity’. Vidmar Horvat (2012, p. 31, emphasis from V. H.) argues that this notion of diversity

...entailed the protection of cultural expression against the pressures of Americanization and globalization”. However, as Calhoun (2003) observed the intention behind this policy was to Europeanize Europe and this has also been done, as Shore (2006, p. 14) argues, by “Europenising the cultural sector” through a whole set of policies meant to foster one European cultural space based on distinctive European heritage and civilisation (e.g. Europe day). This motto ‘United in diversity’ does tend to diminish presupposed differences between the east and the west since it acknowledges diversity however it is questionable to whom this characteristic of diversity is pointed to and how we can understand this. But, since there is no explanation and due to the enormous campaign of the EU to present itself as diverse, we might believe that elites in the EU think on all diversities present in the EU.

The EU recognized cultural cooperation as vital in its policies during the 1990s and in line with that the EU launched several programs to foster cultural cooperation with which it sought to “achieve three main objectives: to promote cross-border mobility of those working in the cultural sector, to encourage the transnational circulation of cultural and artistic output; and to foster intercultural dialogue”10. But, it took until the new Millennium for the EU to start engaging in fostering cultural policy further.

Therefore, in 2005, The General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, at the meeting in Paris from 3 to 21 October 2005 at its 33rd session a Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, Annex I.a) was introduced. That Document in the preamble lists 21 point that serves as a basis for promoting cultural diversity that is understood as the common heritage and the basis of humanity that should be preserved and cherished. This document apparently served as a basis for a new document introduced two years later.

In 2007 the Commission of the European Communities introduced a document United Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European agenda for culture in the globalizing world [SEC(2007)
This document opens with a quotation from Denis de Rougemont who particularly outlined diversity and culture and their intertwined nature. The Document then continues by insisting on a common cultural heritage of Europe expressed in its diversity by stating that:

“Culture lies at the heart of human development and civilisation. Culture is what makes people hope and dream, by stimulating our senses and offering new ways of looking at reality. It is what brings people together, by stirring dialogue and arousing passions, in a way that unites rather than divides. Culture should be regarded as a set of distinctive spiritual and material traits that characterize a society and social group. It embraces literature and arts as well as ways of life, value systems, traditions and beliefs.” (Communication, 2007, p. 2).

With this, the Document clearly underlines the civilisational aspect of culture and culture is seen as a string that binds people and embraces fields such as literature, arts, ways of life, value systems, traditions and beliefs. In line with Calhoun’s (2003) argumentation, it appears as if the EU never departed from its civilisational aspect in fostering its culture.

After stressing that culture is what brings people together and what culture entails the Document then goes on to quote Dario Fo who pointed out that even before Europe was united on an economic level it was the culture that served as a unifying factor for all countries in Europe and European culture means that Europeans share

“For a common cultural heritage, which is the result of centuries of creativity, migratory flows and exchanges. They also enjoy and value a rich cultural and linguistic diversity, which is inspiring and has inspired many countries across the world” (Communication, 2007, p. 2).

This is a further development of Calhoun’s (2003) argument in which the EU insists on its cultural heritage but, at the same time, admits part of it came from migrations with which it accepts migrant cultures as well. The Document then particularly outlines that in the heart of Europe lies the fact that it is united in diversity and this is seen as indispensable in this globalising world in which Europe should ensure a stronger place on the international scene. Cultural policy of the EU is here strictly relying on the Treaty and its Article 151 that, as already

The commitment held public discussions related to the ‘European agenda for culture’ and its implementation but responses mostly came from “the older member states” and in December 2006 the second consultations were held by the EC’s Directorate General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) under the title ‘Culture: a sound investment for Europe’. In early 2007 the EC held inter-service consultation during all Directorates General (DGs) of the EC. While the framework was input and later in the same year the Communication document was introduced. Europe is all the dreams and labour tending towards forging humanity. Culture requests the principle of unity, taking stock of differences to reach culture even more. Europe is a culture or it is not” (Communication, 2007, p. 1).

mentioned, fostered cultural diversity that will respect national and regional diversity of all Member States but that will also bring common heritage to the fore.

This document, however, mostly recapitulates what the EU had already done and which programs it enforced to foster cultural collaboration and dialogue, such as framing the year 2008 as the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue or year 2009 as a European Year of Creativity and Innovation.

But, after exploring all programs that the EU has already enforced and after emphasizing that the EU will work together with its Member States rather than replacing their already existent policies, the document continues with challenging the EU’s external relations by stating

“Culture is recognized as an important part of the EU’s main cooperation programmes and instruments, and in the Union’s bilateral agreements with third countries. It is also a key element of the co-operation developed with the Council of Europe, which has allowed the joint implementation of the European Heritage Days as well as some actions in the Western Balkans” (Communication, 2007, p. 6).

This means that the Article 151 is being interpreted through its international domain. International cultural cooperation has also been outlined in its mention of the Commissions’ diplomacy to third countries about Europe and “its identity and its experience of building bridges between different cultures” (Communication, 2007, p. 7).

On the other hand, the Document claims that the Commission has recognized the need to intervene in developing countries and regions as well as to be more present in the world with its international cultural policy. In this, the Document cites recent pollsters:

Recent opinion polls clearly show that, under the pressure of globalization, the great majority of Europe’s citizens – led by the Heads of State and Government in June 2006 – want Europe to be more present in the world, with an external policy which well reflects its values.

“Culture is a vital element in international relations. Cultural policies, that are being introduced or announced, it appears that

The Document also states that enforcing of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions illustrates this international engagement in fostering cultural diversity at the international level. The main objectives that are stressed in the document are Cultural diversity and cultural dialogue, Culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the Strategy for growth and jobs and Culture as a vital element in inter-
place itself in a global position as a significant actor. This seems in line with the priority the EU has had since its existence, i.e., its foreign policy. The only difference is that this time it seems as if the EU's cultural policy serves as a means to foster its strength to become a player in world politics or, that culture is being used to promote Europe as strong and to challenge the lack of adequate foreign policy roles in the rest of the world.

The Communication (2007, p. 2, 3) also recognizes problems and challenges the EU is facing when it comes to cultural exchanges that are seen as "lively and vibrant as ever" because of the freedom of movement that "has greatly facilitated cultural exchanges and dialogue across borders". Demand for cultural activities and cultural goods are on the increase due to the new communication tools but at the same time "globalisation has increased the exposure to more diverse cultures from across the world. This has heightened our curiosity and capacity to exchange with and benefit from other cultures, and contributed to the diversity of our societies. However, this has also raised questions about Europe's identity and its ability to ensure intercultural, cohesive societies".

With this statement, the Document recognises the problem of the European identity and the need to ensure a cohesive society but at the same time, the document continues by recognizing that cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue presents a major challenge in the global world. By the signing of UNESCO's Convention, the EU has greatly contributed to this understanding, as stated in the Document. But, Europe's role is then presented as a key factor on an international agenda:

"Europe's cultural richness and diversity is closely linked to its role and influence in the world. The European Union is not just an economic process or a trading power, it is already widely and accurately perceived as an unprecedented and successful social and cultural project. The EU is, and must aspire to become even more, an example of a "soft power" founded on norms and values such as human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, freedom of expression, respect for diversity and intercultural dialogue, values which, provided they are upheld and promoted, can be of inspiration for the world of tomorrow. Europe's cultural richness based on its diversity is also, and increasingly so, an important asset in an immaterial and knowledge-based world. The European cultural sector is already a very dynamic trigger of economic activities and jobs throughout the EU territory. Cultural activities also help promoting an inclusive society and contribute to preventing and reducing poverty and social exclusion. As was recognised by the conclusions of the 2007 Spring European Council, creative entrepreneurs and a vibrant cultural industry are a unique source of innovation for the future. This potential must be recognised even more and fully tapped if communication, 2007, p. 2, 3).

Some authors recognize that policies like this one, but also others, are seeking to build legitimacy for the European project (Sassatelli 2002; Shore, 2000, 2006). Others have also observed that these cultural policies have been "instrumentalised to generate the sense of 'shared belonging' in the EU" (Vidmar Horvat, 2012, p. 28) while those that are empowered do not have the power to speak for themselves. This means that those who have power have the “ability to invent futures” (Clifford 1988, p. 9; Vidmar Horvat 2012, p. 28).

Fisher (2012, p. 1) called European cultural policy as an "ad hoc" policy lacking "strategic objectives, insufficiently rooted in local need" and lacking "insufficient engagement with local cultural sector" while the budget remains inadequate as well as systematic evaluation. The EU's cultural policy, in this view, competes with policies of its Member State while it should complement them as a facilitator and initiator and not the organiser of the cultural policy (p. 4).

In the most recent period the EU made an attempt to further strengthen its cultural policy by introducing the previously mentioned document entitled, "European Year of Intercultural Dialogue" (introduced by the European Parliament and the Council of Europe in 2008 and announced in the Communication document). These two initiatives (Communication and the European Year of Intercultural dialogue) fostering the intercultural dialogue "marked a new era of embracing cultural diversity as a feature of European identity. Intercultural dialogue as promoted by EU documents was proposed as a way to better understanding cultural differences in the member states and gaining insight into how the member states addressed this diversity" (Vidmar Horvat 2012, p. 31).

However, EU’s cultural documents have not been introduced without criticism. Vidmar Horvat (2012) states that the assumption of the Communication document is impractical because the Document outlines the need for the EU’s involvement on the global scale. She thinks this way because the international scene that the Document describes does not consist of an “open, democratically conceived field of exchange and contacts among diverse societies of the world, in which the EU would be only one partner in the dialogue among equals. Rather, the EU global agenda implies control." (p. 40). In this sense, this Document enforced by the EU indeed be seen as “cultural hegemony” (Vidmar Horvat, 2012, p. 40). This is because the Document indeed finds crucial for Europe

To develop active inter-cultural dialogue with all countries and all regions, taking advantage of the various orientations of European language links with many countries. In this context, it is also important to promote the richness of cultural diversity of our partners, to serve local identities, to promote access to culture of local populations and develop an economic resource which can have a direct impact on socio-economic development” (Communication, 2007, p. 10).

Fo (2009, p. 51) argued that the EU’s desire to “reinvent itself as a privileged line of arbitration and dialogue between civilizations” is the EU’s goal and line with the Communication document that outlines the need for the EU’s global cultural agenda since this citation interprets the common European
identity that can also be considered to bring back the "imperial thought, now powerfully revived by forces of globalization" (Vidmar Horvat, 2012, p. 40).

Another criticism that can be directed towards the EU's external documents is the previously observed fact that it does not give voice to those without power to speak for themselves but rather remains a project made by European elites fraught with a certain degree of imperial tensions. These somewhat imperial tensions are exposed in 'selling' diversity as a role model for countries of the so-called Third world where the EU is meant to play a significant role in imposing their own views on how to maintain and manage cultural diversity as it has been the case with the enlargement processes when the EU imposed its own views on how to manage, for example, minority rights to potential members12.

Due to the growing xenophobia in the EU itself it is very questionable how Europeans really cherish its diversity and which policies would the EU bring to the so-called Third world. But, it would be unfair to state that the EU only wants to enforce imperial hegemony on the rest of the world while at the same time being xenophobic. The EU is, at the same time, investing a great deal of funding and energy to combat problems within the EU itself that includes xenophobia and intolerance. Furthermore, if the EU is considered as an elite managed project then it can be considered as more open to diversity than the opposite. But, these issues should, perhaps, be solved before the EU begins grasping for opportunities to 'teach' others how to manage these sensitive issues. Additionally, as Vidmar Horvat (2012) observes, the EU should not impose itself as a role model but rather collaborate on cultural exchange. Cultural policies oriented towards outside are indeed meant to legitimize the very European project but this policy is present inside the EU through a whole set of programs that are being financed inside different initiatives to foster mutual understanding and a sense for diversity.

The first such event that can be considered as relevant is the initiative entitled "European City of Culture" and this practice was in line with standard EU policy of respecting local culture while at the same time, through this initiative, strengthening the European consciousness (Sassatelli, 2005). The initiative has been launched in 1985 and until 1999 only one city each year received the title City of Culture. After the turn of a new Millennium, in 2000 nine cities earned that title to mark the symbolic nature of the new Millennium and European unification process (City-mayors, 2012). In 1999 the initiative was renamed to Cultural Capital of Europe and the new selection procedure entered in force in 2005. According to the explanation from the European Commission's website, the European Capital of Culture's purpose is to:

- highlight the richness and diversity of European cultures
- celebrate the cultural ties that link Europeans together
- bring people from different European countries into contact with each other's culture and promote mutual understanding
- foster a feeling of European citizenship" (European Capital of Culture, European Commission, 2011).

The explanation adds that this event proved to be very fruitful to

"renew cities, raise their international profile and enhance their image in the eyes of their own inhabitants, give new vitality to their cultural life, raise their international profile, boost tourism and enhance their image in the eyes of their own inhabitants" (European Capital of Culture, European Commission, 2011).

This policy is meant to foster a feeling of European citizenship but also strengthen Europe's international position. However, this is not the only policy addressed to European citizens. The Europe day presents a policy that can be considered as an internally oriented cultural diplomacy because it clearly makes an attempt to foster European identification among Europeans themselves.

According to the official information from the European Commission, Europe day is celebrated on 9th May each year to celebrate the 'Schuman declaration' or, in the speech of Robert Schuman (the French foreign minister) given on 9th May 1950 where he

proposed a new form of political cooperation for Europe, which would make war between European nations unthinkable. His vision was the creation of a supranational European institution that would manage pooled coal and steel production. A treaty creating such an entity was signed not under a year later and came into force in July 1952. Schuman's proposal is considered to be the beginning of what is now the European Union. At an EU summit in Helsinki in 1989, it was decided that 9 May would be celebrated as 'Europe Day'. Europe Day is

"an opportunity for activities and festivities designed to bring the EU's institutions closer to people and the blue's peoples closer to one another"13.
Each year, to celebrate the Europe day a poster is issued, with an annually different theme and motto, ranging from those only celebrating the European Union and its motto 'United in diversity' (2005; 2004) to those that send a message that Europe is being built through the EU (1996, 1997) and that the EU means peace, solidarity, prosperity and democracy. In these claims, peace is constant even if other motifs change (2006; 2001)\(^6\).

However, after 2001 the EU started to use Europe day posters to promote important decisions the EU has made such as ‘The Euro: The European Union in your hand’ (2002) with which the EC promoted European currency that has always been questioned in Europe.

In 2003 poster promoted enlargement process, another contested issue with a motto ‘Enlarging the European Union – A historic step’ (2003)\(^8\). This has also happened in 2009 when important European elections occurred with a poster with the motto ‘European elections 4 June 2009 – It’s your choice’ (2009).

The idea of culture slowly started to bear more relevance in EU politics then the promotion of dialogue, interculturalism and the EU’s new motto ‘United in diversity’ and posters started to promote the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue with a motto ‘It’s not them and us – It’s you and me – European Year of Intercultural Dialogue’ (2008). ‘My favourite mix – People, places, cultures’ and ‘Growing stronger together’ (2012)\(^9\). With this the EU is making significant efforts to promote its decisions even within the EU itself and this includes respect for cultural diversity that is, nowadays at least, at the core of the EU cultural policy and the idea of united Europe.

Europe day celebrations do not end at this poster dissemination. The activities are also organized in every Member State and, with small differences they are usually centred on celebration of European unification in a form of the EU. Organization usually includes festivals and various programs and quizzes for adults and entertainment for children. However, the level of importance and attention is not the same and Europe is not united in celebrating its unification process.

In some cases this celebration also includes political speeches such as, for example, in Finland where the speakers address various issues present in the EU such as the Greek financial crisis and European elections. The events usually attract attention from the public that positively reacts to these celebrations (Rilić, 2011) due to its European identification not present in other northern countries where being European is a secondary identification (Delanty, 2005).

On the other hand, in the UK Europe day is barely celebrated and attracts very little interest from the public. In 2011 the reluctance to celebrate Europe day was so significant that the Downing Street refused to fly the European flag on the Europe day (Ichijo, 2011) that presents a reflection of the UK’s position towards the EU, and its large non-European identification that is considered as the weakest in Europe (Delanty, 2005).

The celebration is also organized in the EU accession candidates such as Turkey and Croatia. In the first case, Turkish government is also included in the organization by issuing its own posters to promote the idea of Turkish membership in the EU (Kaya and Tecmen, 2011), while in Croatia (scheduled to join the EU in July 2013) there is no celebration of the Europe day but of the European week which is a unique practice and it is not accidental because Croatia is EU’s most Eurosceptic candidate ever (Eurobarometer 75, Topić et al 2009, Topić and Vasiljević 2011; 2011a). As for the activities, “The European week usually starts on 2nd May each year and ends on 9th May or, on the actual Europe day. The activities are mostly performed by the Delegation of the European Commission in Croatia however Croatian Ministry of foreign affairs and European integration actively participates as well” (Topić et al, 2011, p. 1)\(^6\).

Although some authors, as already noted, claim Europe does not exist (Delanty, 2005), when it comes to the object of this study, as we have demonstrated, the EU is investing significant efforts to create and to foster creation of European identity and then, recently, to create a European identity based on common civilization and culture, as well as to develop strong cultural policy. The EU is also making an effort to Europeanize its own citizenship and in it employment of various practices such as the European City of Culture initiative, Europe day celebration and, practices such as common currency Euro and the EU flag and anthem – that some authors recognize as a creation of a symbolic European identity (Bassuissely, 2005) – are being deployed. Even if these policies are top-down oriented and can be considered as the project of elites they still exist.

It is evident that the EU has started to invest significant efforts in its cultural diplomacy pointed towards its own citizenship and exter-
nally oriented cultural diplomacy. However, the EU's cultural diplomacy is compact in a sense that the same value of diversity is being promoted inside the EU as well as outside. It still remains open whether its cultural diplomacy pointed towards outside of the European boarders can be considered as hegemonic and imperial as some authors claim however, this practice certainly exists.

Content of the volume

In this volume we have no intention to offer a definite definition of cultural diplomacy. We assume that cultural diplomacy entails many aspects such as art, the media, externally oriented cultural policies and tourism and that cultural diplomacy can be managed by governmental and non-governmental sector with the first appearing more often than the second.

We also assume that cultural diplomacy, sometimes, contributes to stereotyping and that it can also entail religious figures that address the domestic audience and the wider, international one and, because of it, their practices become part of cultural diplomacy, as well.

We see cultural diplomacy as a means to present the country, but this does not necessarily mean that we are talking about nation branding or public diplomacy or that we consider cultural diplomacy as propaganda per se. This rather means that cultural diplomacy can have various shapes and be pointed towards inside and towards the outside of the country but, at the same time, it is often intertwined with public diplomacy (particularly when it comes to academic exchanges that are seen as part of public diplomacy). Its role is as understood by the scholarship as well, to promote ideas and to encourage a dialogue, and it is a long-term process, which is why unlikely for public diplomacy uses culture and the so-called slow media (art, films, language courses, etc.) as a means for achieving its goals.

We are exploring a variety of practices in cultural diplomacy in several European cases. We are also exploring whether cultural diplomacy often entails imperial policies and policies of enforcing cultural hegemony and imperialism.

We understand cultural imperialism as a domination that is enforced to impose values culture and tradition of the dominator over the dominated.

We are generally departing from the view that some countries in Europe have a different understanding of cultural diplomacy or, in line with division mentioned at the beginning of this study, some countries understand cultural diplomacy as international cultural policy and some countries understand it as developing cultural relations while the EU policy makers clearly understand cultural diplomacy in both of its shapes, i.e. as international cultural policy enforced towards outside of the EU and as developing cultural relations (through policies implemented abroad as well as inside the EU itself).

As already noted, to discuss cultural diplomacy in Europe we selected ten case studies where we are exploring art, externally oriented cultural diplomacy, stereotyping and something we call Inside-Outside oriented cultural diplomacy, and we are examining these distinctive policies within the European framework.

The first section is entitled 'The art' and it encompasses two chapters. Both chapters have a strong historical dimension. While the first chapter discusses historical events, the second chapter is discussing consequences of historical colonialism as found today. However, both chapters discuss the notion of cultural imperialism and hegemony where one culture imposed itself over another.

M. Székely discusses Hungarian cultural diplomacy enforced via art exposures and presentations of Hungarian art in international exposures and pavillons in 19th century. Through in-depth discussion of Hungarian policy toward art exposures, the chapter outlines the basis of the consciously build Hungarian self-representation was determined by the strong historical awareness of the political and financial elite devoted to national conventions, the will to make the economy prosper and refine the culture. Behind these ends, there was the intention to rebuild the modernized ancient great power that felt oppressed inside the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy. With this, culture served as a means to push the idea of “Independent Hungarian Kingdom” and the long Hungarian statehood. This paper, therefore, reveals some of the Hungarian historical discourses when it comes to enforcing of the national and the imperial (since Hungary was also in union with Croatia that was subordinated to it) via culture that served as a foundation for meeting the international policy objectives.

In her paper Margarita Kefalaki, using an ethnographic approach, examines French cultural imperialism over Corsica that diminished Corsican language and traditional dances. When France gained power over Corsica, it imposed its language and traditional dances that were the symbols of rebellion towards colonization were banned. Because of this, younger generations today have a weak knowledge of their tradition. Kefalaki argues that the dominators should bear more attention to what their domination is doing to the local culture but, at the same time, that dominators should improve their communication in preserving their national culture and heritage. This chapter shows the consequences of imperial and hegemonic dominance and the importance of culture and art when it comes to imperialism and stratification of one culture over another. The chapter also shows the importance of cultural relations and exchange.

The following section is entitled 'Externally oriented Cultural diplomacy' and encompasses four papers discussing manifestations of cultural diplomacy via
externally oriented cultural policies or, the lack of it. This externally oriented cultural diplomacy can be indeed considered close to public diplomacy; however, we consider these policies as cultural diplomacy with external orientation and thus closely attached to public diplomacy but not as being part of it. It is notable that the present externally oriented cultural diplomacy follows the previous EU model where each Member State presents itself while there is no recognition or the sense of Europe in presentations except in cases of the EU accession candidate countries that emphasize their European heritage and civilisation.

The first chapter is written by A. Ichijo who examines British cultural diplomacy by firstly offering a short analysis of what cultural diplomacy is and then placing her case study in the context she proposes. According to her analysis, an in-depth examination of activities of the British council that defines its activities as cultural relations has been recognized as a policy projecting Britishness abroad through public and cultural diplomacy. While projecting their culture and collaboration with other countries, British councils actually enforce diplomacy via cultural activities yet this diplomacy is not clearly articulated. Therefore, it manifests in presenting the UK abroad as well as through ‘advertising’ its education system, the language, etc. With this, the UK is using a dual approach; from one point it enforces activities belonging to public diplomacy (academic exchanges) but from another point it promotes its language that belongs to the field of cultural diplomacy. The UK policy makers apparently understand cultural diplomacy through both of its prisms: cultural relations and international cultural policy. With the UK being the former colonial power – as well as a country with the lowest European identification – it is visible that the UK, although having a badly articulated cultural diplomacy, does not present Europe nor its European heritage but rather itself that is in line with previous EU’s policy of keeping cultural diplomacy inside national domains.

A. Kaya and A. Tecmen write the second chapter that discusses the role of Yunus Emre cultural centres in Turkish cultural diplomacy using the multiple modernities approach. As explained, Turkey has been placed on a position of a role model for other Muslim countries due to its moderate Islam that brings Turkish civilisation to a higher level. Through the discussion of activities of Yunus Emre cultural centres, the paper reveals that the Turkish government generates a cultural/religious/civilisation discourse on a parallel with the rhetoric of Alliance of Civilisations to promote Turkey in the EU and other parts of the world using a neo-Ottoman discourse. In this, Turkey particularly emphasized, in its promotional activities directed towards the EU, its differences but, at the same time, also its close ties with the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Although all of these activities were meant to foster Turkey’s European integration, when activities are inspected it appears that Turkey is fostering its hegemony rather than advocating Turkey’s EU membership. With this policy, the Turkish case clearly presents a case of imperial tendency as well as a case of using culture and cultural diplomacy to foster the national. By opening institutes promoting ‘modern’ Islam and the higher level of civilisation, Turkish officials also understand cultural diplomacy through cultural relations that they are trying to develop. On the other hand, Turkish policy makers also understand cultural diplomacy as a useful contribution to the international cultural policy with somewhat imperial character.

In his comparative chapter, Laurens Runderkamp outlines basic features of cultural diplomacy in Germany and the Netherlands. Whereas both countries tend to deploy policies meant to foster their culture Germany seems to be more successful in it due to its high budget as well as a strict approach and a clear agenda on what to promote, where to promote itself and how this promotion should be done. The Dutch, on the other hand, tend to deploy more flexible approach where everybody gets certain attention while nobody gets enough. Both countries tend to present themselves to Europe and to the world whereas when it comes to the world, they mostly collaborate with countries with which they have historical relations coming from their past such as, for example, Sri Lanka in the case of the Dutch or Central Europe in the case of Germans. The outline of this chapter suggests that these two countries that are also the so-called old members of the EU are acting similarly as the EU itself by presenting themselves to Europe and the rest of the world. On the other hand, in their presentations they do not promote Europe and the European culture but their national culture. It seems that the case of the UK, when it comes to these two countries, not much has changed since the beginning of the EU when founding Treaties left cultural policies in hands of the Member States. On the other hand, although these two countries do not enforce imperialism, they are using theirs imperial history to present cultural diplomacy that they obviously understand through international cultural policy.

B. Bolmarce and G. Sapunaru write the last chapter in this section. In their analysis of the Romanian case, they emphasize that Romanian external cultural diplomacy went through different variations that were, inevitably, connected changes of regime. In the Romanian case, the cultural diplomacy “somehow lost its focus, due to its unclear objectives, slow institutional mechanisms and its anti-civilisation tendency of the past figures and values. And while it is open to international relations, it is not understood by its historical partners, it has a poor internal management of cultural policies and the diplomatic objectives”. Historical eras generated equivalent patterns for the evolution of the meaning of Europe where in the interwar period being meant being European while, on the other hand, during the Com-
After 1989, the cultural diplomacy lost its focus and the Romanian society feels alienated from Europe while, at the same time, negative stereotyping of Romanians, particularly in destinations where they often immigrate, occurred. Romanian cultural diplomacy seems to be loosely oriented towards inside and outside, but inside it causes the lack of European identification whereas towards outside it causes stereotyping and a bad image of Romanians. Cultural diplomacy in Romania also seems to be understood through international cultural policy, that remains open for international partnership, however, due to poor policies the effect is negative.

The following section is entitled ‘Stereotyping’ and it encompasses two chapters discussing consequences of an inadequate cultural diplomacy.

The first chapter is written by D. Chalaniova who writes about Czech-Slovak separation after the fall of Communism and the stereotypes that exist between two nations, now both members of the EU. The mutual stereotypes (that the author call hetero-stereotypes) still exist and by examining stereotypes that existed before the dissolution as well as those that exist now, the chapter also discusses the role of cultural diplomacy in promoting positive stereotypes and mutual understanding between Czechs and Slovaks. Among other stereotypes, Czechs see Slovaks as slowly overcoming their historical backwardness while Slovaks see Czechs as imperial. The lack of adequate cultural diplomacy in societies fuelled with stereotypes created animosities between two nations that resulted in separation of the two states while today it presents an obstacle to a full understanding although the tensions calmed. This chapter shows the significance of stereotypes when enforced publicly and the importance of adequate cultural and public diplomacy or the negative effect when there is a lack of it. This chapter also demonstrates the importance of the second aspect of cultural diplomacy: developing cultural relations that should foster mutual understanding and present one country to another. When there is a lack of it, a place for prejudices opens up, particularly in countries with turbulent pasts.

The following chapter is written by D. Albano who discusses Berlusconi’s rule and the influence of his leadership, as well as a lack of cultural diplomacy, had on Italy and stereotyping of Italians. Berlusconi’s behaviour fostered stereotyping on Italians as sometimes passionate and irrational people. However, Berlusconi’s gaffes were covered in European and international media and because of the underplaying of the implications of his behaviour to the European political arena, in the end, his policies damaged Europe at the peak of an unprecedented financial crisis. Berlusconi’s lack of cultural diplomacy became the European problem and, not solely Italian one; however, this example also demonstrates fragmentation in Europe itself as well as insufficient regulation when it comes to the media (European and international) that, clearly, have a significant influence on both Italy and Europe. The outline of this chapter demonstrates international perception of Europe that is presented through behaviour of the EU member states regardless of the EU’s official cultural diplomacy, as well as the fact that public diplomacy and public appearance always affect cultural diplomacy and when the first is shallow the second becomes overshadowed with it even in places with a rich history and culture.

The last section is entitled ‘Inside-Outside oriented Cultural diplomacy’, and in this section we are exploring two cases where countries claim to have a certain level of civilisation that distinguishes them from other countries and makes them superior, as well as two countries that clearly use dual policies in enforcing their cultural diplomacy by promoting one thing inside the country and another outside of its borders.

A. Sakellariou discusses the cultural diplomacy of Greek Orthodox Archbishop, who was an international figure that could be considered as a part of the country’s cultural diplomacy since he often discussed civilisation and culture in his speeches, writes the first chapter. The Archbishop’s speeches were, nonetheless, addressed not only to the Greek audience but also to the European one. The author argues that this policy had a dual aspect of addressing Europeans in one way and the Greeks in the other way. In this, the Archbishop used one content when addressing Europeans, i.e. he addressed Europeans by discussing Islam while, when addressing the Greeks, he used division between immoral west and moral east with west being a threat to the Greek society. Furthermore, in the European context the solid Greek-Orthodox identity was transformed into European-Christian identity. Outline of this chapter shows manipulations with culture, civilisation and religion that are used to foster image of a country and its position toward larger European framework while towards the outside these elements are then discussed to achieve forming of the stronger national identity. Cultural diplomacy within Greek Orthodox Church apparently understands the role and significance of culture through cultural relations that will, if being fruitful, advance country’s reputation. On the other hand, culture is in international policies understood as a means to strengthen the feeling of national

Lastly, M. Topic writes about Croatia’s tourist offer that belongs to cultural diplomacy and not nation branding, as she argues. It appears that Croatia attaches tourism by claiming it to be ‘cultural tourism’, however, this is integrated with Croatia’s historical discourse of Europeanism. In this, Croatia’s historical cultural discourse was (historical) unquestionable belonging to Europe and the Europeanisation circle that is emphasized in the tourist offer. With this, Croatia wishes to present itself as unquestionable cultural specialness and importance but this also
gives credit to the European cultural and civilisation superiority that it claims to belong to since the tourist offer tends to outline European civilisation and culture. On the other hand, when it comes to internal policies then only national is being enforced and with this Croatia uses a dual policy in developing its own identity, i.e. towards the outside it is unquestionably European whereas towards the inside it is unquestionably national. The outline of this chapter suggests that Croatia presents an example of a country that is approaching the world by promoting itself but also Europe by aligning itself with the current European cultural policy of strengthening its image of rich culture and ancient civilisation. From another point, this policy presents a case of instrumentalising European to foster the national while the cultural diplomacy is understood as international cultural policy and promotion.

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**Section I:**

**The Art**